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TrE HARBOR MAINTENANCE TAX: ALL DREDGED UP AND
NO PLACE TO GO
David M. Messer*
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE HARBOR MAINTENANCE CONTROVERSY
Even the most cursory reading of the history of the United States will
reveal a particular American disdain for taxes in all forms. The nature and
shape of the democratic republic and the Constitution that establishes its
form of government was forged in the furnace of revolution fueled by the
Sugar Act, the Stamp Act, the Townshend Acts, and countless other taxes
imposed on the Colonies by the British Crown during the 1700's.' In the
Convention that ultimately produced the Constitution in 1787, the mem-
ory of earlier taxation issues rose to the surface of the debate.2 As a direct
result, many of the various articles of the Constitution were written spe-
cifically to limit the federal government's ability to levy taxes on the citi-
zens of the new country.
One such limitation was the Export Clause, a seemingly innocuous
phrase that simply declares "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles ex-
ported from any State.",3 In the days before trains, automobiles, steam-
boats, or airplanes, the ocean-going sailing ship was the only link for
communication and commerce between the Old World and the New. Just
as the creators of the Constitution never could have envisioned the mag-
nitude of the transformation of the transportation industry, or even the
types and sizes of vessels moving cargo via the oceans in the 1990's,
neither could they have envisioned a time when the simple Export Clause
* Mr. Messer is employed as the International Operations Manager for the Tulsa, Okla-
homa, office of Team Air Express, Inc., a full-service freight forwarding company. He has
been employed in the air and ocean transportation industry for seven years, and much of this
article is based upon his industry experience.
I. See generally JOHN A. GARRATY, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN NATION (3 rd
ed. 1981)(summarizing the various taxes enacted upon the colonies from their founding until
the Declaration of Independence).
2. See Brief for Respondent at 10-11, United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 1998
WL 19842, at *10 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1998)(No. 97-372)(quoting 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS
OFTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 305-06 (rev. ed. 1966).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
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would become the center of a controversy over billions of tax dollars. The
Export Clause, essential to the compromise that allowed the signing and
ratification of the Constitution, is indeed the central issue of judicial con-
cern in the question of the Harbor Maintenance Tax.
The Harbor Maintenance Tax was imposed in 1986 as part of the
comprehensive Water Resources Development Act,4 and was subse-
quently codified in the Internal Revenue Code.5 The tax was implemented
on an ad valorem basis for the use of federally-maintained waterways. 6
Only the use of inland waterways was excluded from the tax.7 The tax
applied equally to imports, exports, domestic shipments, and passengers, 8
although certain specific commodities and activities were excluded. 9
The stated purpose of the Harbor Maintenance Tax was to fund the
maintenance of federally-maintained harbors and ports.'0 A major part of
this maintenance involved the dredging of the harbors and channels of
United States ports, a process made necessary by both the natural process
of silting and the increasing size and draft of vessels calling those ports.
Primary responsibility for this activity for some time has been delegated
to the United States Army Corps of Engineers."
In order to administrate the collection and distribution of the tax,
Congress authorized the United States Customs Service to collect the tax,
which was paid by the exporter or importer of record, or the shipper of
record."2 The tax was originally set at a rate of .04% of the value of the
shipment, 13 but was later increased to .125%, an increase of more than
300%.'4 These funds were placed in the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund,
created in the same Act as the tax.' 5 Disbursement of funds required ad-
ditional authorization by Congress.16 The primary designated recipient of
these funds were the United States Army Corps of Engineers, the De-
4. See United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 907 F.Supp. 408, 411 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1995); see also Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, 100 Stat.
4082 (codified as amended in scattered titles of 33 U.S.C.).
5. See United States Shoe Corp., 907 F.Supp. at 411; see also Harbor Maintenance
Tax of 1986,26 U.S.C. § 4461 (1994).
6. See 26 U.S.C. §§4461, 4462(a)(2) (1994).
7. See id. §4462(a)(2)(A)(i) (1994).
8. See id. §§4461(c)(1), 4462(a)(3)(A) (1994).
9. See id. §4462(a)(3)(B) (1994). The statute specifically exempts a wide variety of
commodities and uses from the Harbor Maintenance Tax. A list of some cargoes exempted
include: fish and other aquatic animals not previously landed on shore, bunker fuel, ships'
stores, equipment necessary for operations of a vessel. See id.
10. See S. Rep. No. 99-126, at 7 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6639, 6644.
11. See id.
12. See 26 U.S.C. §4461 (c)(1)(A)-(C) (1994).
13. See S. Rep. No. 99-126, at 18 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6639, 6650.
14. See 26 U.S.C. §4461(b) (1994).
15. See id. §9505(b) (1994).
16. See id. §9505(c) (1994).
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partment of the Treasury, and the Department of Commerce.17
The process for the collection of the tax for exports was fairly
straightforward. With each shipment over a U.S. port, Customs required a
Shipper's Export Declaration to be presented to Customs as a part of the
required documentation accompanying the shipment' 8 While payments
of the Harbor Maintenance Tax could be made at any time, the general
practice was to file a report quarterly with Customs of all exports moving
via the ports. 9 This report verified the total value of the exported goods
which were subject to the tax. This figure was then used to calculate the
amount of the tax on an ad valorem basis, with the funds being submitted
to Customs and subsequently placed in the Harbor Maintenance Trust
Fund for disbursement at a later time when authorized by Congress.2
Almost from its inception, the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund ran a
significant surplus. By the end of fiscal year 1996, the Fund had a cumu-
lative surplus of over $865 million, and projections at the time were pre-
dicting a surplus of $3 billion by the year 2001.2 The annual expendi-
tures of the Fund were approximately $480 million, including funding for
part of the maintenance under an agreement with Canada for portions of
the St. Lawrence Seaway.22
United States Shoe Corporation brought an action in 1994 to recover
the taxes paid on exports during the second quarter of 1994, alleging that
the Harbor Maintenance Tax was an unconstitutional tax on exports in
violation of the Export Clause.2 The Court of International Trade held
that the tax was indeed unconstitutional as applied to exports.24 The
United States government appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit in 1997, where the decision of the lower court was
upheld.u The United States subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court
which affirmed the ruling of the court of appeals. The Court held that the
Harbor Maintenance Tax, only as applied to exports, was an unconstitu-
tional tax on exports in violation of the Export Clause.26 This review and
analysis of the history of the entire controversy, from the Court of Inter-
17. See id. §9505(c)(3) (1994).
18. See 15 CFR §30.3 (1997). See also 15 CFR §§30.1-30.22 (1997)(for general over-
view of the various requirements of the Shipper's Export Declaration).
19. See 19 CFR §24.24(e)(2)(ii) (1993).
20. See 26 U.S.C. §§4461(b), 9505(c) (1994).
21. See Brief for Respondent at 3, United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 1998
WL 19842 (U.S. ]an. 15, 1998)(No. 97-372).
22. See id.
23. See United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 907 F.Supp. 408, 412 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1995).
24. See id. at 421.
25. See United States Shoe Corporation v. United States, 114 F.3d 1564, 1577 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
26. See United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1290, 1296 (1998).
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national Trade through the Supreme Court, will examine the constitu-
tional issues raised in the case, including those raised by the government
in defense of the tax. In addition, some of the questions which remain
following the decision will be examined.
The ultimate power of the Supreme Court is the power to declare a
statute, properly introduced by the Congress and signed into law by the
President, to be a violation of the Constitution itself.27 In such instances,
the Court exercises its primary check and balance of the other branches of
government. Constitutional challenges are relatively rare, and never taken
lightly. The Court is very cautious to venture into the domain of the
elected representatives, and does so only when the rights, freedoms, and
responsibilities of the citizens are being violated by existing law.
Congressional statutes are presumed constitutional unless success-
fully challenged in court.23 The Harbor Maintenance Tax was collected in
accordance with the statute until successfully challenged by U.S. Shoe.
29
In arguing this case, U.S. Shoe Corp. relied on the doctrine of stare deci-
sis, historical precedent, to buttress its position regarding the nature of the
tax. A line of historical cases regarding the nature of Congressional taxa-
tion limits, particularly related to exports, was examined in detail. This
controversy is of particular interest in that the government significantly
changed its position between the district court trial and the appellate trial.
In doing so, two entirely separate and distinct arguments arose. The first
regarded the limits, if any, of the authority of Congress to regulate com-
merce. This issue was determined first at the Court of International Trade,
and upheld at the appellate level and by the Supreme Court. 30 The second
issue concerned the nature of the various tests used to distinguish be-
tween constitutionally permitted user fees and unconstitutional taxes, first
determined by the court of appeals. In the subsequent appeal, the Su-
preme Court examined the issue and provided a different analytical
framework for testing a user fee for constitutionality.3
II. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
As in all court battles, the proper forum is both essential to insure a
sound judgment and a ripe ground for conflict. Whether the effort to de-
feat jurisdictional authority by the government was a matter of forum
shopping or zealous advocacy is irrelevant; the courts at all levels exam-
ined and ruled on the question of proper jurisdiction.
27. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 ( 1803).
28. See Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 285 (1901).
29. See United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 907 F.Supp. 408, 412 (Ct. Int'l
Trade, 1995).30
-See United States Shoe Corp., 118 S.Ct. at 1296.
3 1
.See id. at 1295.
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In the statute establishing the Harbor Maintenance Tax, Congress
expressly granted jurisdiction over issues arising from the tax to the Court
of International Trade.32 Quoting the language of the statute, the court
held that "[flor purposes of determining the jurisdiction of any court of
the United States or any agency of the United States, the tax imposed by
this subchapter shall be treated as if such tax were a customs duty."33 The
court further examined the legislative history, as well as its previous role
in deciding issues arising from the Harbor Maintenance Tax, as grounds
for its jurisdiction over U.S. Shoe.3 4
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the gov-
ernment argued that jurisdiction was found only under 28 U.S.C. §
1581(a) instead of § 1581(i) as claimed by U.S. Shoe Corp. 5 The conten
tion is clear for an obvious reason: 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) requires the ex-
porter to file a protest with Customs before seeking judicial relief, and
then limits recovery only to amounts protested within ninety days of
payment.36 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (i) allows the action to be filed without an
initial Customs protest within a two-year statute of limitations from the
date on which the cause of action originally arose. 7 Jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1581(a) is the more exacting standard, and has the effect of
eliminating all those claims pending before both the Court of Interna-
tional Trade and the Federal Court of Claims for which no initial Cus-
toms protest was filed.
The court of appeals found that 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) required a "de-
cision" to be made by Customs, a protest of the decision, and a denial of
the protest, before judicial review is sought.3 8 The government argued
that the receipt of payment was sufficient to be a "decision," but the court
found this argument lacking. 39 Relying on a previous decision from Dart
Export Corp. v. United States, 43 C.C.P.A. 64 (1956), the court noted that
a protestable decision involved an analysis and adjudication by Customs,
not mere acceptance of funds.' The court determined that Customs
merely accepted funds authorized by statute.' It thus held that § 1581(a)
was not applicable.42
The court then examined 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) as the only remaining
32. See United States Shoe Corp., 907 F.Supp. at 410.
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. See United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 114 F.3d 1564, 1570 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
36. See id. at 1568.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 1568-69.
40. See id. at 1569.
41. See id.
42. See id.
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basis of jurisdiction. It found first that the language of the statute itself
authorized jurisdiction over the matter.43 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) refers to
"administration and enforcement with respect to the matters referred to
in" the previous provisions of the statute.44 The court determined that the
action before it was clearly such a matter of "administration and en-
forcement."'4 The court also turned to precedent in its decision in Conoco
Inc. v. U.S. Foreign Trade Zone Board, 18 F.3d 1581 (Fed Cir. 1994), in
which it held that 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) "was intended to give the Court of
International Trade broad residual authority over civil actions arising out
of federal statutes governing import transactions. . ."4 Since the statute
authorizing the Harbor Maintenance Tax treated the Tax as a customs
duty for jurisdictional purposes, the court of appeals found that the Court
of International Trade indeed had sufficient jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(i) to hear the matter. 47
In the subsequent appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the court of ap-
peals regarding the jurisdictional question.48 In addition, in a footnote to
the ruling, the Court stated that the Court of Federal Claims lacked juris-
diction over Harbor Maintenance Tax issues, as such jurisdiction was
properly found in the Court of International Trade.49 The Court recom-
mended that plaintiffs with claims before the Court of Federal Claims file
motions under FED.R.CIV.P. §1631, allowing for inter-court transfers to
the Court of International Trade for hearing.50
III. THE ABILITY OF THE EXPORT CLAUSE TO LIMIT THE CONGRESSIONAL
POWER TO REGULATE COMMERCE
Congress has almost unlimited power to regulate commerce between
the several states and foreign nations granted to it by the Constitution.51
At the Court of International Trade, the government argued that the
Commerce Clause was superior to the Export Clause, allowing a tax on
exports if the tax was solely for the purpose of regulating the commerce
affected by exports and not for the purpose of raising revenue. 52 U.S.
Shoe Corp. countered that such was not the case, arguing instead that the
Export Clause was a limitation on the commerce power given to Con-
43. See id. at 1571.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. See United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1290, 1293 (1998).
49. See id.
50. See id. at 1294.
51. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
52. See United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 907 F.Supp. 408, 413 (Ct. Int'l
Trade, 1995).
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gress.m In determining the proper understanding of the Export Clause, the
courts turned not only to precedent, but also to the legislative intent of the
Founders from the records of the Constitutional Convention of 1787.54
The Export Clause was one of a number of highly controversial ele-
ments of the Constitutional Convention. 5 The question of export taxation
was one of great significance to the compromises that enabled the Found-
ers to join two economically diverse regions into one unified nation. The
discrepancy between the Northern colonies and the Southern colonies in
terms of exported products during the time of the Revolution was severe.
The North produced few manufactured goods, while the South was
abounding in agricultural products for export such as tobacco, turpentine,
and cotton. The Southern delegation to the Convention feared that a Con-
gress controlled by the North could strangle the Southern economy by
levying an oppressive tax on exports. An equal fear was that a dispropor-
tionate amount of the federal revenue could be raised from revenues pro-
duced by taxing Southern prosperity in the form of exports by a Northern
controlled Congress, if Congress was given the authority to tax exports.
Several amendments to the Export Clause were proposed at the Con-
vention, yet all failed. The first would have changed the wording of the
clause to prohibit export taxes only "for the purpose of revenue,"5' thus
opening the door to export taxation of some regulatory nature. The sec-
ond proposal would have granted Congress the authority to tax exports
with the approval of a two-thirds majority of both Houses.57 Other
amendments offered the possibility of exemptions for certain commodi-
ties,% or the option that the export tax ban should run for only a limited
number of years.5 9 All attempts to amend the Export Clause failed.60 Con-
gress was expressly denied the power to tax exports.
The government attempted to apply the non-revenue producing,
regulatory standard to the issue of the Harbor Maintenance Tax in U.S.
Shoe.61 In doing so, it relied on the "exception" allowed in Moon v.
Freeman, 379 F.2d 382 (9f Cir. 1967), for regulatory programs author-
ized by the Commerce Clause that have little economic impact on the
53. See id. at 411.
54- See id. at 413.
55. See Brief for Respondent at 10, United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 1998
WL 19842 (U.S. Jan 15, 1998)(No. 97-372)(quoting 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OFTHE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 305-06 (rev. ed. 1966).
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 10-11.
61. See United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 907 F.Supp. 408, 413 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1995).
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exporter.62 Freeman is a single, non-challenged anomaly in the broader
spectrum of Export Clause decisions. In Freeman, a wheat farmer failed
to comply with the terms of wheat export regulations, resulting in a fed-
erally imposed expense of $168.63 The farmer sued to recover the funds,
claiming them to be an unconstitutional tax on exports.64 The court held
that the funds were not an export tax, but instead a user fee, permitted
under the Commerce Clause because it was regulatory in nature instead
of revenue producing; therefore, it was not limited by the Export
Clause.65 Part of the court's rationale was that the Commerce Clause and
the Export Clause were not to be taken together, but instead that each had
separate and distinct powers within themselves.66 This holding was
somewhat of a departure from the traditional line of cases interpreting the
power of the Export Clause.
The interpretation of the overarching power of the Commerce Clause
as interpreted in the holding of Freeman was not followed in U.S. Shoe.67
The Court of International Trade instead looked to the language of the
Export Clause itself, and also to the holdings from both Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824), and North American Co. v. S.E.C.,
327 U.S. 686 (1946). In Gibbons, the Court held that commerce power
"is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and ac-
knowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
constitution."68 In North American, the Court found that Congress's
commerce powers are limited by "express provisions of other parts of the
Constitution."69 The Court of International Trade found an express limi-
tation to the power of the Commerce Clause to be contained in the Export
Clause.70
Following the decision from the Court of International Trade, the
government filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court heard another
appeal requiring an interpretation of the Export Clause. In United States
v. International Business Machine Corp., 517 U.S. 843 (1996), the Court
reaffirmed the historical interpretation of the power of the Export Clause
to limit Congress's taxation authority. 71 The Court found that a tax based
62. See id.
63. See Moon v. Freeman, 379 F.2d 382 ( 9 th Cir. 1967).
64. See id. at 386-87.
65. See id. at 393.
66. See id. at 389.
67. See United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1290, 1296 (1998).
68. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 196 (1824) (emphasis added).
69. North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686,704-05 (1946).
70. See United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 907 F.Supp. 408, 413 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1995).
71. See United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843. 863
(1996).
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on the value of a marine insurance policy for an export shipment was in
fact an indirect tax on the export itself, and thus was a violation of the
Export Clause.72 In short, the Court stated "the requirement of the Con-
stitution is that exports should be free from any governmental burden."73
Shortly after the IBM decision was announced, the government withdrew
the "Export Clause v. Commerce Clause" argument from the appeal,
choosing to focus instead on an entirely different issue, that being the
definition and construction of a permissible user fee.
The court of appeals noted, in passing, the ability of the Export
Clause to limit the Commerce clause, based on IBM, and turned its atten-
tion to the issue of whether the Harbor Maintenance Tax is a pure tax or a
user fee. 7' The Supreme Court also emphasized the power of the Export
Clause in its ruling in U.S. Shoe, based on the language from its decision
in IBM, holding that "the Export Clause allows no room for any federal
tax, however generally applicable or nondiscriminatory, on goods in ex-
port transit."75'
The Court thus established a rationale consistent with historical
precedent and legislative intent. The Export Clause serves as a limitation
on the commercial regulatory power of Congress by prohibiting the taxa-
tion of goods in export transit. As a result of this holding, a determination
of the nature of the fee imposed is required in order to resolve the issue in
U.S. Shoe. If a fee is determined to be a tax, it is by its very nature uncon-
stitutional. If, on the other hand, a fee is found to be a permitted user fee,
it will pass the constitutional standard. As a result, the government case
on appeal is limited to a discussion of the nature of the Harbor Mainte-
nance Tax itself; specifically, whether the Harbor Maintenance Tax is a
permissible user fee allowed under the Export Clause.
IV. TAX OR USER FEE?
The courts over the years have established a primary and secondary
test for determining whether a charge on a good or service is a regulatory
user fee or a tax. In making this determination in U.S. Shoe, the Supreme
Court addressed only the primary test, enunciated in Pace v. Burgess, 92
U.S. 372 (1875).76 The secondary test, enunciated in Massachusetts v.
United States, 92 S.Ct. 1153 (1978), was discussed in the decision by the
court of appeals.7" In this analysis, both will be examined to reveal the
72. See id. at 846.
73
- Id. at 848.
74. See United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 114 F.3d 1564, 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
75. United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1290, 1294(1998).
76. See id. at 1295.
77. See United States Shoe Corp., 114 F.3d at 1571-72.
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rationale of the courts on this issue.
In 1868, Congress enacted a law which required a federal excise tax
to be paid on tobacco products.78 The only exemption was on tobacco
intended for export.79 To insure that tobacco was properly taxed and not
fraudulently exempted and later diverted for domestic use, the govern-
ment required a stamp to be placed on each package of tobacco intended
for export.80 The cancelled, affixed stamp was evidence that the federal
excise tax had not been paid on the tobacco.81 Originally, the cost per
stamp was twenty-five cents. 2 This amount was later lowered to ten cents
per stamp in the revised act of 1872.83
In Pace, the manufacturer brought suit against Burgess, the tax col-
lector, seeking to recover the money paid for the stamps over a period of
four years, alleging that the payment for the stamps amounted to a tax on
exports.8 4 The court instead held that the fees were not a tax on exports,
but instead a fair payment for services rendered to the manufacturer by
the tax collector.85 It reasoned that the purpose of the stamps was not the
raising of revenue, but just the contrary. The stamp did not levy a tax; it
allowed for exemption from a tax, a clear benefit to the exporter.86 In the
process, a two-part test developed which has been used historically to
differentiate between a tax or duty and a use fee.
The first part of the test involves the basis of the valuation for the
fee. In Pace, neither the value nor the quantity of the tobacco covered by
one stamp was defined by Congress.87 There was no limitation to the size
of the package,88 whether it was a single box or an entire bale. The stamp
was a per unit fee, with the shipper alone determining how much tobacco
was in one unit. In the language of Pace, the value and size of the unit
was "unlimited, except by the discretion of the exporter or the conven-
ience of handling." 89 The stamp fee was specifically not an ad valorem
fee.
In addition, the Pace court found that the fee was not excessive in
relation to the service provided.90 The court held that it was reasonable
for the government to collect a fee calculated to cover the costs of ad-
78. See Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372,374 (1875).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See 1d.
84. See id. at 373-74.
85. See id. at 375.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89
.Id.
90. See id. at 376.
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ministrating a program that gave tax exemption, holding that "[T]he
proper fees accruing in the due administration of the laws and regulations
... are in no sense a duty on exportation. They are simply the compensa-
tion given for services properly rendered."'I
In U.S. Shoe, the Supreme Court specifically employed the two
prongs of the Pace test in order to determine whether the Harbor Mainte-
nance Tax, as applied to exports, was a permissible user fee or a tax.92
The first prong of the test is the basis of valuation, the method by which
the amount of the fee is determined.93 The Court held that the Harbor
Maintenance Tax was based solely on the value of the cargo, a true ad
valorem fee.94 It thus violated the first part of the Pace test. The second
prong of the test required that a user fee must be directly related to the
cost of the benefit received by the shipper.9" In applying the second prong
of the test to the Harbor Maintenance Tax, the Court noted that "the con-
nection between a service the government renders and the compensation
it receives for that service must be closer than is present here."96 The
court held that the Harbor Maintenance Tax violated both aspects of the
Pace test and thus was a tax, not a constitutionally permitted user fee.
9 7
The government argued that ad valorem-based fees had been found
permissible by the courts, citing three separate and distinct bases of
authority found in the Constitution.98 Three diverse cases are used to sup-
port the argument. In United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52 (1989),
Sperry attacked the validity of a 1.5% user fee collected on all claims
awarded by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, a tribunal established
to settle claims related to the freezing of Iranian assets in the United
States following the exile of the Shah. In rejecting Sperry's argument, the
court held that the user fee was not required to be an exact valuation of
the cost in each particular case, but merely a "fair approximation" of the
cost of the total administration of the tribunal.9 This "fair approximation"
received from the proceeds of each claim was determined to be a lawful
taking under the authority of the Takings Clause. °° As applied to the
Harbor Maintenance Tax, the government argued that the tax was valid,
as a more precise valuation of the costs of services rendered to the ex-
porters was not required.'01 Thus, the government argued that the Takings
91. See id. at 375.
92. See United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1290, 1295 (1998).
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 60-61 (1989).
100. See id. at 58-59.
101. See United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1290, 1294-95 (1998).
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Clause serves to give a constitutional basis of authority to develop an ad
valorem based user fee for the Harbor Maintenance Tax.'0 2
The government also cites Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority
District v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707 (1972), as authority for the valid-
ity of the ad valorem nature of the tax. 03 In Evansville, the court upheld a
flat user fee charged per person utilizing the flights to and from Dress
Memorial Airport in Evansville, Indiana. 0 4 The Court upheld the validity
of the tax as it was a fair compensation for the service rendered by the
airport authority.' 5 As it did not unnecessarily restrict interstate com-
merce and travel, the court found that the flat rate fee assessed on all pas-
sengers, regardless of destination, was not in violation of the Commerce
Clause 0 6 In U.S. Shoe, the government attempts to apply the Evansville
holding to the Harbor Maintenance issue, asserting that the fee is "a per-
missible user fee" for the benefit rendered to the shipper, and thus is a
valid user fee under the auspices of the Commerce Clause.'0 7
Furthermore, the government looks for support to Massachusetts v.
United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978), in which a flat federal fee on aircraft,
including state owned aircraft, did not violate a state's immunity from
federal taxation. The court in Massachusetts held that the fee was a fair
compensation for the services provided to state owned aircraft operators,
i.e., the efforts of the Federal Aviation Administration, navigational aids,
air traffic controllers, etc.'0 8 In doing so, the court enumerated a three-part
test to determine the validity of a user fee.'°9 First, the fee could not dis-
criminate against a constitutionally protected interest."' Second, the fee
must be a fair approximation of the amount of use of the service."' Third,
the cost must not be excessive in relation to the actual costs of providing
the service." 2
This alternative test is not addressed by the Supreme Court; the sec-
ond prong of the test is, however, examined in some detail by the court of
appeals in the decision on appeal from the Court of International Trade.
The first and third elements are ignored completely. The court found that
the Harbor Maintenance Tax failed this test on a number of levels. First,
the "amount of the [Harbor Maintenance Tax] has no relationship to the
102. See id.
103. See United States Shoe Corp., 118 S.Ct. at 1295.
104. See Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405
U.S. 707, 717 (1972).
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. United States Shoe Corp., 118 S.Ct. at 1295.
108. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 466 (1978).
109 See id. at 467.
110. See id.
111 . See id.
112. See id. at 469.
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size or weight of the vessel or the necessary depth of the port required by
the vessel."" 3 As an example, the court pointed to the reality that a low
value, high bulk product (e.g., timber), would pay less Harbor Mainte-
nance Tax than a high value, low bulk product (e.g., computer parts),
even though the port needs of the high bulk carrier would be significantly
greater.114 Second, there is no direct correlation between the amount of
money collected at a given port and the cost of operating or maintaining
that particular port."' Third, a true user fee is generally very broadly
based, and the court found that the Harbor Maintenance Tax was riddled
with too many exempt commodities and port uses to be a true user fee.' 6
The court of appeals thus rejected all three of the arguments from the al-
ternative test that the government holds forth for the validity of the Har-
bor Maintenance Tax as a valid user fee.
In its final decision, the Supreme Court returned to the supremacy of
the Export Clause in restricting congressional authority to tax exports as
its primary basis for reaching a determination for the constitutional valid-
ity of the Harbor Maintenance Tax.!17 Sperry is valid under the Takings
Clause; Evansville is valid under the Commerce Clause; Massachusetts is
valid under the State's Immunity Clause, but all three fail under the Ex-
port Clause. 8 Regardless of other bases for validity, the strict, narrow
interpretation of the language of the Export Clause prohibits actions al-
lowable under other Constitutional provisions.
The logic of the Court is simple and straightforward. The Harbor
Maintenance Tax fails both prongs of the time-honored Pace test." 9 It is
therefore not a user fee, but a tax. 20 In the aspect to which this tax is ap-
plied to exports, it is unconstitutional, a violation of the specific prohibi-
tion on the taxation of exports found in the Export Clause.'2'
V. QUESTIONS REMAINING FOR CONSIDERATION
While not examined by the Supreme Court, the Court of Interna-
tional Trade addressed the definition of "exported articles" to determine
the precise nature of an export shipment under the Export Clause. 22 It
113. United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 114 F.3d 1564, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
114. See id. (referencing United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 907 F.Supp. 408,
415 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995)).
115. See id.
1 1 6
. See id.
117. See United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1290, 1296 (1998).
118. See id. at 1295.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 1295-96.
121. See id. at 1296.
122. See United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 907 F.Supp. 408, 415-416 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1995).
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defined two tests by which it is possible to determine when a cargo enters
the stream of exportation.' 3 The first is the "immediacy of the exporta-
tion.' 2 4 Even if the cargo has not yet exited the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, if the documents transferring title to the foreign entity
have been transferred and the cargo delivered to the carrier, the goods are
considered to be in transit for export."u While this definition may be
helpful in defining an export shipment in theory, there could be possible
conflicts with the language of existing international business practices.
The latest revision of the Incoterins 1990, adopted by the Interna-
tional Chambers of Commerce, defines in clear language the rights, re-
sponsibilities, duties, and liabilities of shippers and consignees in the pro-
cess of international transportation of goods. 26 While not binding in
terms of international law or treaty, 27 the use of Incoterms in defining
transportation responsibilities is often embodied in the language of com-
mercial contracts. Much of the language of the specific Incoterms in-
volves a determination of the point at which the cargo passes hands, the
point at which title and liability is transferred.'
2
The differing "legal definition" and "practical definition" could
cause some confusion. Consider, for example, a shipper from Chicago
moving cargo via intermodal transport (a combination of truck and ocean
vessel) to London, England. The terms of the shipment are DDU 12---de-
livered, duties unpaid. The shipper is responsible for the goods and
maintains title until the goods are delivered to the buyer's door. 30 If the
language of the court (cargo tendered to carrier and transfer of title) is
applied to determine the point at which the cargo enters the "stream of
export," then the answer in this case is London. This seems to be a
strange conclusion when the cargo has in fact been in transit, out of the
United States territorial control for several thousand miles! A possible
solution to this confusion is to define the language more succinctly. An
export can easily be defined in a manner consistent with the Incoterms
and U.S. export policy as follows: A cargo is said to have entered the
stream of export transit at the earliest point at which either the title is
transferred in accordance with the terms of sale (Incoterms), or the cargo
is tendered to the carrier at the point of export This distinction would
123. See id. at 417.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126
.See generally FRANK REYNOLDS, INCOTERMS FOR AMERICANS (1993)
("[s]implify[ing] and answer[ing] questions about Incoterms for U.S. foreign traders"). In-
coterms are international sales/shipping terms, used in an attempt to unify agreement on
shipping terms.
127. See id. at 4.
128. See id. at 3-4.
129. See id. at 89.
130. See id.
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avoid either pre-mature or delayed identification of the point at which a
cargo enters the stream of export without requiring a re-writing of the
Incoterms.
VI. R mEDMS
Another issue confronting the courts following the U.S. Shoe decision is
the issue of remedies. It is important to note that the decision on the trial
court level was one of summary judgment; a full hearing was never un-
dertaken. 1' The requested refund was limited to a request for the tax col-
lected over the prior two years, a statute of limitations found in Customs
related claims. 2 In a strongly worded concurring opinion, Judge Mus-
grave argued that any tax imposed and collected unconstitutionally was a
violation of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, a "deprivation of
'life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. " 33 He further ad-
vised a full refund of all Harbor Maintenance Taxes received from ex-
ported goods since the inception of the tax.134 In looking at the impact on
the government, Judge Musgrave noted that a full refund will hardly be a
strain on the Harbor Maintenance funding system, as only approximately
$700 million had been collected in export taxation over the years of the
$2.7 billion collected in total. 135 As the current surplus is in excess of $1
billion, with surpluses expected to continue to grow on import revenues
alone, he urged a total refund to all exporters who have paid the Harbor
Maintenance Tax. 36
As of July 10, 1998, over five thousand seven hundred claims were
pending before the Court of International Trade related to the Harbor
Maintenance Tax on exports. 3 7  Following the Supreme Court's rul-
ing in U.S. Shoe, the matter of remedy was returned to the Court of Inter-
national Trade for adjudication. 38 The court received proposals from
plaintiff, defendant, and various third parties, and issued a court order
regarding the Harbor Maintenance 'Claims Resolution Procedure on July
23, 1998.139 The process outlined in the Court's plan covers claims for
refunds of the Harbor Maintenance Tax paid on exports for all claimants
131. See United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 907 F.Supp. 408, 421 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1995).
132. See id.
133. Id. at 421-422 (Musgrave, J., concurring).
134. See id.
135. See id. at 426.
136. See id.
137. See Jack Lucentini, Judging the Harbor Maintenance Tax, J. OF COM. (July 6,
1998) <http://www.joc.com>.
138. See United States Shoe Corp v. United States, No. 94-11-00668, 1998 WL
419353, at *1 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1998).
139. See id.
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having a claim before the court dated within two years of the filing of
U.S. Shoe."4 The question of the impact of the statute of limitations on
older claims is still pending, as is the issue of jurisdiction over claims
which have previously not been before the Court of International Trade.
The court has selected Stone Container Corp. v. United States, Court No.
96-10-02366, and Swisher Int'l., Inc. v. United States, Court No. 95-02-
00322, to serve as test cases for these as yet unresolved issues. 4 ' Recog-
nizing that many claimants have claims involving these two issues in ad-
dition to claims related to exports only, the court is requiring severance of
all other claims from export claims in order to expedite refunds.'42 The
process outlined by the court for the refund of the tax paid on exports is
straightforward, and progresses in three stages.
The first phase is an initial review of all claims currently before the
court. 43 Each claimant will complete a claim form no later than October
15, 1998, and submit it to the United States Customs Service for certifi-
cation.' 44 Customs is then required to search its electronic databases for
140. See id.
141. See id. at *2.
142. See id.
143. See id. at *1.
144. See id. The Harbor Maintenance Tax Refund Claim Form is re-created as fol-
lows:
HARBOR MAINTENANCE TAX REFUND CLAIM FORM
Date of Filing of First Complaint: -__ __ __ / __
Month Day Year
Instructions: Please supply all of the information requested below. If pay-
ment was made under more than one name or exporter identification number,
please identify all possible names and EINs. Attach additional sheets if nec-
essary. This form is to be used only by exporters who have filed complaints
in the Court of International Trade. Any forms submitted by exporters who
do not have a case pending will not be processed.
(cont'd)
1. Name of Plaintiff(s):
2. Exporter Identification Number(s):
3. Exporter Address(es):
4. Please list all complaints and date of filing in the Court of International
Trade covered by this refund claim form and attach copies to this form.
5. Has the plaintiff previously received from the Government any refunds of
Harbor Maintenance Tax payments on exports for any reason? __ No.
_ Yes.
If the answer is "yes," please specify the dates and amounts of such refunds:
6. Name and Address to which Harbor Tax Maintenance Payment Report and
Certification is to be Mailed____
Payment Information or Documentation Supplied by Plaintiff (optional)
Authorized Representative of Plaintiff
Court No.
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the payments claimed by the exporter on the claim form. 45 Once this
search is completed, Customs returns the form to the claimant on the
Harbor Maintenance Tax Payment Report and Certification form.'
46
The claimant then has an opportunity to review the information received
from Customs. 47 If no discrepancies are found or challenged, the claim-
ant certifies the form, signifying agreement with Customs records, and
submits the Form, along with an official judgment to the Department of
Justice for signature, and filing with the court."~
145. See id.
146. See id. The Harbor Maintenance Tax Payment Report and Certification form is
recreated in full as follows:
HARBOR MAINTENANCE TAX PAYMENT REPORT AND
CERTIFICATION
A. To be completed by Customs:
I. Name of Plaintiff (including all known variations):
2. Exporter Identification Number:
3. Quarterly Payments Not Previously Refunded to Plaintiff
Payment Quarter Amount Paid Date Paid
Total Amount Paid
4. Refunds, If Any, Previously Made By Customs
Payment Quarter Amount Refunded Date Refunded
Total Amount Refunded
5. Total Amount Due
Signature of Customs
B. To be completed by plaintiff:
I hereby certify on behalf of plaintiff that, to the best of my knowledge and
belief, plaintiff paid the Harbor Maintenance Tax payments listed in number
3 and is entitled to a refund of those payments as listed in number 5.
Authorized Representative of Plaintiff
147. See id. at *2.
148. See id. The Judgment form is recreated in full as follows:
JUDGMENT
Pursuant to the procedures established by Order of the Court in Slip Op.
98--, it is hereby agreed by counsel for the parties,
(A) Plaintiff, _ _ ; and
(B) Defendant, the United States of America ("United States") that:
1. The claims and refunds covered by this Judgment are claims in Court
No(s). _ (attached) relating to payments of the Harbor Mainte-
nance Tax (HMT) on exports.
2. The court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).
3. The action was commenced on
4. The amounts set forth on the attached Harbor Maintenance Tax Payment
Report and Certification were HMT payments for exports that plaintiff has
certified were made and that have not previously been refunded.
5. Plaintiff is entitled to refunds of the payments on the attached Harbor
Maintenance Tax Payment Report as provided by law in accordance with the
1998]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
The court is requiring a minimum of five hundred claims to be proc-
essed by Customs each month, with the first set to be presented to the
court no later than December 15, 1998.'49 An additional five hundred are
due each month thereafter. 50 These terms make it clear that the court ex-
pects a rapid and systematic refund of all monies due and properly
claimed in refund.
The second phase of the process is set to begin no later than March
15, 1999, or sooner if the Phase I review is completed ahead of
schedule.'' In the event that a claimant disagrees with the information
provided by Customs on the Certification Form in Phase I, each claimant
is required to submit documentation in support of their disputed claim to
Customs, who must again attempt to verify the accuracy of the claim. 52
In doing so at this level, a search of the hard copy records is required as
well as a search of the electronic databases. 153 It is presumed that many
disputes will be settled during this process based on information supplied
by the exporters. Once this additional verification is completed, Customs
will provide an amended Harbor Maintenance Tax Payment and Certifi-
cation Form to the exporter as in Phase V 154 If agreement is reached this
time, the claimant will submit the signed Certification, along with a
judgment form, to the Department of Justice for signing, filing, and pay-
ment. 1
55
Phase M is the final step, and is reserved for claims in which dis-
putes are not decided in Phase I and 11.16 In this step, disputes will be
brought before the court as would any other dispute for relief involving a
decision in United States v. United States Shoe Corp., -- U.S. -, 118
S.Ct. 1290, 140 L.Ed.2d 453 (1998).
6. Interest shall be paid on the refunded amounts in accordance with a
schedule set by the court should appellate court proceedings in International
Business Machines Corp. v. United States, Court No. 94-10- 00625 finally
resolve that interest is owing on HMT payments.
7. All other non-severed claims in this action are dismissed.
8. Undersigned counsel for the United States and for plaintiff represent that
they are authorized by the United States and plaintiff, respectively, to con-
sent to this judgment form.
9. The refund checks issued pursuant to this judgment shall be mailed to
plaintiff within 30 days, care of the undersigned attorneys for plaintiff.
10. Each party will bear its own attorney fees, expenses and costs.
SO ORDERED:
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
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court-ordered remedy.' 7
One variation of the Phase I documentation process arises due to the
nature of the day to day operations of an exporter. Many corporate and
individual exporters utilize the services of freight forwarders not only for
arranging loading and transportation, but also for export documentation
as well. In many instances, this includes the processing and presenting of
the Shipper's Export Declaration to customs at the time of export. This
document is the source of the information regarding the exporter of rec-
ord, the exporter's Federal Employee Identification Number, the nature
and quantity of goods being exported, and their value. The information
from this form was used to compute the amount of the Harbor Mainte-
nance Tax on exports. Many exporters used freight forwarders to compile
a quarterly sum of their shipments, and to calculate and pay the Harbor
Maintenance Tax on their behalf.
In these cases, the court has recognized that Customs will be faced
with an impossible burden in sorting out which payments by which
freight forwarder were for the benefit of which exporter. ' 8 As such, the
court is requiring exporters in this category to provide additional detailed
information to assist Customs in locating the necessary information, in-
cluding copies of form CF349, the Quarterly Summary Report, and other
forms or compilations that will assist Customs in identifying and properly
crediting tax payments.' 9
The issue of interest due on refunds is also currently pending final
settlement. While the court has ordered interest to be paid, it recognizes
that the government has a right to appeal, and has issued a stay on interest
payment pending final resolution.' 60 At present, it has selected Interna-
tional Business Machine Corp. v. United States, Court No. 94-10-00625
as the test case for determining the payment of interest.' 6' Should it find
that interest is indeed owed, a second refund will be paid based on the
court's interest schedule and the amounts paid to the claimants in the first
judgment.162
VII. IMMEDIATE EXPANSION OF U.S. SHOE
U.S. Shoe holds that the Harbor Maintenance Tax on exports is a
violation of the Export Clause.' 63 The Court of International Trade wasted
no time in applying this ruling to other situations pending before it, fur-
157. See id.
158. See id. at *1.
159. See id.
160. See 1d.
16 1. See id. at *4.
162. See id. at *1
163. United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1290, 1296 (1998).
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tfher dismantling the current Harbor Maintenance Tax in a decision on
June 9, 1998, less than three months after U.S. Shoe.
In Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, No. 94-06-00352, 1998
WL 418109 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1998), Princess Cruises brought suit against
the United States opposing the collection of Harbor Maintenance Taxes.
The statute authorizing the Harbor Maintenance Tax required the tax to
be collected not only on goods in export or import, but also on passengers
based on the value of the ticket for passengers leaving United States
ports.' 64 Following the reasoning of U.S. Shoe, the court found that since
the Harbor Maintenance tax on exports was unconstitutional, and since
the statute itself deemed passengers to be "exports" for the purpose of the
Harbor Maintenance Tax, the Export Clause controlled in this instance as
well.s' The Court held on summary judgment that cruise passengers are
not subject to Harbor Maintenance Tax liability. 166
Following the order of the Court in U.S. Shoe regarding the refund
process, the court amended its order in Princess Cruises on August 5,
1998, requiring a full refund, plus interest, of all Harbor Maintenance
Taxes covered by the Princess Cruises opinion. 16 7
VIII. THE FUTURE OF HARBOR MAINTENANCE FUNDING
The rule of law is neither created nor maintained in a vacuum; deci-
sions always affect people. While the role of the judiciary has been prop-
erly demonstrated in the constitutional review of the Harbor Maintenance
Tax, this set of decisions will not change the essential nature of harbors,
rivers, and tides. Sand and silt still march inevitably to the sea. The courts
have judged, and now the legislature must act. It is left to Congress to
provide a proper solution to the harbor maintenance problem, one which
will both meet the needs of the Constitution and of the shipping industry.
Several models have been proposed as solutions, and the next Congres-
sional session will be forced to fashion a sound policy]168
The first model is a historical model. For more than two hundred
years, the necessary dredging and maintenance of the ports of the United
States were financed by the general treasury. 69 Philosophically, this
method recognizes the national interest and benefit of a well-maintained
and smoothly-functioning national port system. 7 ' Such a system invites
164. See Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, No. 94-06-00352, 1998 WL 418109 at
*1 (CL Int'l Trade 1998).
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, No. 94-06-00352, 1998 WL 465220 at
*1 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1998).
168. Dredging Harbors, J. OF COM. (Aug. 27, 1998) <http://www.joc.com>.
169. See id.
170. See id.
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the free flow of import and export cargoes, maintaining the flow of trade.
Incoming cargoes move from the ports to all parts of the inland United
States, while the goods produced in factories and farms from the heart-
land move through the same ports. 171 In such a system, the cost of main-
taining the port system is not a debit to be found on a Congressional
budget report, but a necessary investment in a strategic asset of the na-
tion's economic infrastructure.
172
The second model is based on pure free market economics. Instead
of a nationally funded port system, each individual port would succeed or
fail on its own, based entirely on its ability to procure cargoes for import
and export. 173 The assumption is that the use of fees for maintenance
would be deflated because of competition. Arguably, this would require
that some inefficient ports would cease to operate, resulting in lost jobs,
revenues, tax bases, and populations. The resulting inequity is a result too
severe for modem political realities, and in the grand scheme of things is
more likely than not a poor economic decision. Ports do not stand alone.
Economic benefits of the ports are spread across a large geographic re-
gion. In addition, the natural conditions of some harbors (i.e., varying
depths, degrees of silt inflitration, population densities, tides, labor costs)
greatly affect the economic viability of some ports. The pure free market
model is simply not viable in our current diversified, intermodal, trans-
continental, transnational transportation economy. 74
The third model is one recently proposed by the Clinton administra-
tion to replace the current Harbor Maintenance Tax.' 75 This model is
based loosely on the Harbor Maintenance Tax with a few significant
changes, carefully molded and contoured to fit the parameters created by
the rulings in U.S. Shoe. It will be presented to Congress in early Sep-
tember 1998, but probably will not be acted upon this year. 7 6
The model legislation has the goal of raising $980 million, more than
twice the current annual expenditures for the harbor maintenance proj-
ects.' 77 The purpose of the newly-proposed Harbor Services User Fee is
to fund a variety of projects, including maintenance dredging, channel
deepening, terminal berth dredging, the United States' portion of the op-
eration of the St. Lawrence Seaway, 178 maintenance and operation of the
Army Corps of Engineers' fleet of dredging vessels, and the cost of ad-
17 1
. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See Peter Tirschwell, Shippers, carriers, ports assail Clinton harbor tax struc-
ture, J. OF COM. (Aug. 27, 1998)<'http://www.joc.com>.
176. See Tim Sansbury, Clinton team reveals new harbor tax plan, J. OF CoM. (Aug.
26, 1998)<http://www.joc.com>.
177. See id.
178. See Tirschwell, supra note 173, at 1.
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ministrating the Harbor Services User Fee program. 7 9
The proposed Harbor User Service Fee is a fee levied directly against
the user of port services-the vessel owner.'80 Such a fee would pass con-
stitutional muster, at least if applied to the same standard found in U.S.
Shoe. First, there is no violation of the Export Clause as the assessment is
not on an exported cargo, but on a vessel using port services. Second, the
above structure would pass the two-prong approach of the Pace test. It is
not an ad valorem based fee, as neither the value of the cargo nor the ves-
sel is taken into consideration. In addition, the fee would be related to the
service rendered, and could be fairly and reasonably calculated and ap-
plied directly to the point and amount of use-the vessel.
The fee is based on a new unit of measurement created just for this
program, the "vessel capacity unit" (VCU).'8 ' While it is unclear exactly
what a VCU is, and how one is calculated, preliminary indications are
that the VCU is based partially on the gross tonnage of a vessel, the net
cargo tonnage of a vessel, and a factor related to the amount of the vessel
not reserved for carrying cargo."s Bulk carriers and tankers will pay the
fee for each port entry based on a value per VCU, while container vessels
and passenger carriers will pay the fee only on one port of call per voy-
age. 83 The rates are not fixed, but variable, based on the nature of the
cargo.184 For instance, preliminary reports indicate that containerized car-
goes will pay a rate two times that of tankers, five times that of bulk car-
riers, and seven times that of passengers.'8 5 These inconsistencies and
variables make the calculation of the Harbor User Service Fee unwieldy
and unpredictable in terms of revenue projections.
There are many possible criticisms of the Harbor User Service Fee
that oppose the funding plan on a variety of philosophical and practical
bases. First, it can be argued that the new fee is simply the old tax in new
clothing; a de facto tax that will be more than the old Harbor Mainte-
nance Tax and easily passed on to consumers by the vessel owners as a
part of the cost of doing business. 86 In addition, the vessel owners as well
as the exporters using their services already pay corporate taxes.18 7 The
additional imposition of the Harbor User Service Fee would be an unfair
tax burden, especially as the entire country benefits from the use of the
ports and the cargoes moving through them.'88
179. See Sansbury, supra note 174, at 2.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See Tirschwell, supra note 173, at 1.
187. See id.
188. See id.
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Finally, there is some question as to whether the new fee will pass
constitutional muster. Part of the Court's analysis, based on the Pace rule,
requires that the fee be closely related to the service rendered. Some be-
lieve that West Coast ports, which move a heavy burden of freight
through ports which require little dredging, will pay a disproportionate
share of the tax, in essence subsidizing the costs for more expensive, less
revenue-producing eastern ports.I8 9 Only if the port system is considered
as an integrated whole could this system meet the proximity test of U.S.
Shoe.
IX. CONCLUSION
The flow of cargo through the ports of the United States is essential.
The ever-increasing size, both in length and draft, of ocean vessels calling
United States ports requires modernization and deepening of our chan-
nels, berthings, and turning facilities. Such improvements are costly, but
necessary. The Court found the cost of the Harbor Maintenance Tax to be
too great. No amount of dredging can excuse the imposition the Tax
placed on the Constitution.
The decision in U.S. Shoe was appropriate. The Court clearly defimed
the role of the Export Clause in maintaining a proper limitation on the
power of the Commerce Clause, and properly applies the time-honored
interpretations of Pace. In doing so, it affirmed the ideals of the Ameri-
can jurisprudential tradition which require even good and necessary proj-
ects, such as the funding of harbor maintenance, to bow to the integrity of
the document that is responsible for maintaining not only our commerce
and our harbors, but more importantly, our freedoms.
189. See id.
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